E. All of the Causes of Action in the Engallas' Civil Complaint Are
Arbitrable.

     Finally, we turn to the issue whether all of the causes of action
asserted by the Engallas in their complaint are subject to arbitration.
     " '[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' "
     (AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (1986)
     475 U.S. 643, 648 [89 L.Ed.2d 648, 655, 106 S.Ct. 1415]; and see
     Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street,
     supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 323.) 
     Under both California and federal law, the question whether the parties
agreed to submit a given dispute to arbitration is for the court to decide,
unless the parties have "clearly and unmistakably" agreed to submit the
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator.
     (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra,
     514 U.S. at p. [131 L.Ed.2d at pp. 993-994, 115 S.Ct. at p. 1924];
     AT&T Technologies v. Communication Workers, supra,
     475 U.S. at p. 649 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 655-656]; see also
     Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. (1981)
     118 Cal.App.3d 895, 901 [173 Cal.Rptr. 639].)
     No such evidence appearing in this case, it is properly a judicial
function to determine whether this entire dispute must be sent to
arbitration.

     In making that determination, we are mindful of a well-established
principle that has been endorsed by the high courts of both California and
the nation: 
     "Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular
dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration."
     (United Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.
     (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 702]; see also
     AT&T Technologies v. Communication Workers, supra,
     475 U.S. at p. 650 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 656-657].)
     Indeed, as one California court has observed,
     "The general rule is that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be
said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an
interpretation covering the asserted dispute."
     (Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp.
     (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 99, 105 [186 Cal.Rptr. 740].)

    The Kaiser arbitration clause provides, 
     "Any claim which arises from alleged violation of any duty incident to
or arising out of this Agreement, irrespective of the legal theories upon
which the claim is asserted, including any claim for medical or hospital
negligence and premises liability ... shall be submitted to binding
arbitration."
     This broadly worded provision clearly encompasses each cause of action
asserted by the Engallas in their complaint.
     The claims for professional negligence are within the express terms of
the arbitration clause.
     The causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, abuse of process, and fraud all arise from the
same conduct by Kaiser and its attorneys during the aborted arbitration and
involve alleged violation of duties "incident to or arising out of" the
arbitration clause, which is a part of the Service Agreement.
     As all of respondents' claims have their "roots" in the Service
Agreement, we conclude that they are all subject to arbitration as provided
therein.
     (Izzy v. Mesquite Country Club (1986)
     186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1315 [231 Cal.Rptr. 315];